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Attitudes of Knowledge and
Common Sense
Remarks on Reid and Dewey
Claude Gautier
1 In the works of John Dewey, common sense appeared as a cross-disciplinary theme, often
implicated  in  considerations  of  epistemology,1 logic, 2 ethics 3 and  politics. 4 There  are
however a number of texts where the question is addressed more directly. Amongst these
can be mentioned: one of the introductory chapters of Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938):5
“Common Sense and Scientific Inquiry” (LW 12: 66-s.); an article published in The Journal
of  Philosophy in  1948 titled  “Common Sense  and Science:  Their  Respective  Frames  of
References”;6 and an essay in the collection Knowing and the Known (1949)7 co-published
with A. Bentley, which appeared under the title of “Common Sense and Science,” which
took up again the 1948a article. 
2 However, the limited corpus that is directly implicated should not be misleading. It is one
occasion  amongst  others  to  deploy  the  consequences  of  the  pragmatist  “attitude.”8
Amongst those, reaffirming the necessity of understanding that the analysis of common
sense does not spring from the specialised field of ‘the epistemological industry,’9 but de 
jure, from ethics and politics. This is the reason for which envisaging common sense per se
would be an error (LW 16: 242-3).
3 Thus, while the theory of knowledge is useful to this analysis, it is only on condition that
it is admitted that the knowledge implied in and by common sense is determined by its
instrumental character10 and that, by way of consequence, studying its domain imposes
relating it to that which it distinguishes itself from – knowledge specific to science or
philosophy for example – but also, understanding the type of reality to which it refers
and which it contributes to the fashioning of. This explicitly suggests the title of the 1948
article: “Common Sense and Science: Their Respective Frames of Reference.”
4 Finally, the instrumental character of said knowledge allows us to envisage the effects it
produces – whether in the case of common sense or in science – on the transformation of
current and future conditions of experience and action, that is to say on the improvement
of the material and cultural conditions of human existence.
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5 The relations between XIXth century American philosophy and Scottish Common Sense need
no further proving;11 no more than the juncture between this and the first pragmatism.12
The following study retains John Dewey, and to more exactly identify the connection
between pragmatism and the philosophy of  common sense,  will  propose elements of
comparison with the philosophy of Thomas Reid (1710-96).
6 Several reasons justify this choice. Dewey explicitly cites Reid and Stewart in regard to
one of the two definitions of common sense that he comments on taken from the Oxford
Dictionary  (LW 12:  68),  and  he  takes  up,  in  his  own  manner,  one  of  the  Reidian
acceptances of this concept. But, beyond this very marginal reference, there is a deeper
reason that supports this possible comparison.
7 One of the objectives of the philosophy of Thomas Reid is to fight against scepticism as a
philosophical “attitude,” radically embodied in Hume. This criticism thus implies the plan
of an ethos and it does so in a specific manner: by confronting sceptical behaviour with
ordinary behaviours which are related to common sense, it being understood that this
confrontation bears on the status of reality from which the experience of knowledge – the
“powers of intelligence” and human actions – “active powers” find their validity and
their operativity.
8 As if  the question of  academic knowledge,  natural  philosophy and moral  philosophy
supposed, so as to be recognised in its pretensions, the proof of common sense.13 The
interest of this confrontation is thus to show the importance of the relation that must be
rebuilt between common sense and attitude of knowledge – in this occurrence, that of
non-sceptical philosophy. Not just to affirm that a link should exist between the two
types of knowledge, but also because the relation has a function which could, although
this is not in Reid’s vocabulary, be an aspect of a certain type of “control.”
9 This confrontation of attitudes thus constitutes the method and principle of a general
criticism of a certain ethos of  knowledge which means to radicalise the separation of
knowledge of “common sense,” and knowledge of “science.”
10 One of the aspects of the analysis proposed by John Dewey equally articulates attitude of
knowledge, relevant to common sense, with criticism of “intellectualism,” which, through
fallacies of the rationalist type,14 detaches itself from experience, and makes returns to
experience a problem which it cannot manage to resolve.  The taking into account of
common sense, of the world of ordinary experiences, is for Dewey, as it is for Reid, the
occasion to disqualify  this  type of  attitude of  knowledge.  Of  course,  it  remains  that,
beyond this convergence, the arguments and the context of problematisation should not
mask the differences.
11 The discussion of  common sense,  in Dewey,  does not  only involve placing a relation
between two types of  attitude,  it  also implies,  and in a more systematic fashion,  the
posing of the question of the relation between the development of common sense and the
development of sciences. Often understood in terms of a divergence – which can express
itself  as  a  dualist  opposition  between  common  knowledge  and  scientific  knowledge,
theoretical  and  practical  knowledge,  academic  and  ordinary  knowledge,  etc.  –  the
question  of  relation  needs  to  be  re-examined,  according  to  Dewey,  to  identify  two
problems: on the one hand, to understand the manner and the reasons for which, while
maintaining empirically manifest relations, the domains of common sense and science
appear to oppose each other to this point, at the least being more and more independent:
and on the other hand, to found the political and ethical imperative of the reconstruction
Attitudes of Knowledge and Common Sense
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
2
of a deliberate and controlled “return”15 from the domain of science back to the domain
of common sense. 
12 The question of divergence also has a dimension which is not just epistemological in the
usual sense, but moral: indicating the possible pathways of control of the dynamics of the
domain of  science  when it  is  a  case  of  considering the  material,  social  and cultural
consequences that it certainly produces in the common world of life.
13 The domain of the sciences finds in the conditions of experience relevant to the domain
of common sense a source of nourishment for part of its development. In return, the
progress which stems from this is not without consequences that are often imposed on
and not controlled by those affected by them. This is reason for which it is necessary to
become fully aware of these relationships, and even more so, to work towards directing
them so as to better control the effects.
14 This last type of questioning, of course, is not found in an explicit manner in Reid. It
supposes,  historically,  the intensification of  the effects  produced by the dynamics  of
technical  progress  and sciences,  which became more and more visible  in the United
States from the start of the second part of the XIXth century.
15 I will  distinguish two moments in this presentation. In one part,  I  will  return to the
manner in which the critical qualification of an attitude of knowledge permits the posing
in specific terms of the “domain”16 of common sense. In the case of Reid, it is in regard to
criticism of modern scepticism in general and of Hume in particular, that this way of
proceeding  intervenes.  In  the  case  of  Dewey,  it  is  in  regard  to  the  criticism  of
intellectualism.
16 In  both  cases,  relating  to  common  sense  allows  the  identification  of  a  break,  the
radicalisation  of  which  contains  an  aporia:  the  impossibility  of  admitting  truly  the
existence of a knowledge of the world that is practical, and in a certain sense, realist. It is
thus by the placing in relationship of a type of experience which furnishes ordinary life,
and a description of experience, here most often brought to the terms of an exclusive
experience of knowledge, that the implication of common sense finds part of its critical
function.
17 In  other  terms,  the  reference  to  common  sense  allows  us  to  bring  out  one  first
determinant  distinction through which it  becomes  possible  to  reformulate  the  more
general problem of knowledge: “knowledge for action”17 on one side, and on the other,
“knowledge for knowledge.” While this distinction is very clear in Dewey, it will be shown
that it is no less easily identifiable in Reid, even if it is not thematised as such.
18 In another part, and this will be the second moment in this presentation, I will consider
in a more specific manner the problem of relations between common sense and science,
not so as to treat them in general and exhaustively, but to emphasise that that which is
interesting in the point of view of Dewey resides in the placing in relation to each other of
the  epistemological,  ethical  and  political  dimensions  of  the  problem.  This  means
proposing a different reading of the divergence and effective autonomisation of progress
in techniques and sciences.
19 The position of the problem in Dewey aims at the explicitation of the nature and the
extent  of  the  consequences  that  are  certainly  produced  by  the  autonomisation  of
progress in sciences and the privatisation of the interests which govern it. This way of
making the “return-wave” a problem that is equally moral and political, thus allows the
situation of a place for possible social control of the progress of sciences.
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20 This last supposes the making explicit of the types of consequences produced by the logic
of  progress  in  sciences  and techniques,  and making possible  the  socialisation of  the
interests to which this progress can respond, in such a way that in distinguishing the
dynamics proper to common sense and to science they can remain connected. The moral
and  political  demand  for  a  certain  control bearing  on  these  linked  dynamics  should
therefore set itself the task of seeing that these relationships are no longer univocal and
unilaterally determined, but that they become true interactions.
21 From then on, with such a control, progress of techniques and sciences would no longer
impose itself as a unilateral constraint of adaptation, making the human race a species
which is ontologically retarded.
 
Sceptical and Intellectualist Attitudes and the
Common Sense Test
22 If it is admitted that what supports the possible comparison between Reid and Dewey
bears  principally  upon  the  disqualification  of  an  attitude  of  knowledge  and  on  the
manner of mobilising the aid of common sense as a principle of analysis, one can start
from the statement of the problem in the first to attempt, afterwards, to understand how
it is translated and transformed in the second.
23 It is important, however, to specify that this study absolutely does not pretend to an
exhaustive analysis of the positions of Reid in regard to common sense as well as all their
theoretical and practical implications.18 Methodological usage of the comparison allows me
to  limit  what  I  borrow to  that  which  emphasises  the  importance  of  the  connection
between the philosophy of common sense and the pragmatist reading of common sense,
which surely verifies once again that which James could affirm regarding relationships
between modern British empiricism and pragmatist philosophy, the reactivation of “the
older English lines.”19 
 
Common Sense Against Scepticism
24 The practical  orientation which underlies a large number of  remarks bearing on the
disqualification of the sceptical attitude consists, amongst other things, of valorising, in
Reid,  the common identity of  the man of  common sense and the philosopher.  Some
propositions taken from An Inquiry Into The Human Mind of The Principles of Common Sense
(1764)20 easily allow us to be convinced of this: 
By  our  constitution,  we  have  a  strong  propensity  to  trace  particular  facts  and
observations to general rules, and to apply such general rules to account for other
effects, or to direct us un the production of them. This procedure of the understanding
is familiar to every human creature in the common affaires of life, and it is the only one
by which any real discovery in philosophy can be made.21
25 From  Inquiry onwards,  the  question  of  attitude  of  knowledge  is  posed  in  terms  of
“constitutions,” “propensities,” that is to say of tendencies, the origin of which comes from
a constitution. The ordinary pathway of a given type of knowledge proceeds from the
particular  to the  general,  it  is  inductive. And  this  inductive  character  is  not  first
determined  by  an  overlying  reason,  but  is made  by  an  acquisition  supported  by
experiences, these being the same as those which, in ordinary life, confront us always
with particular cases from which operate a certain need for generalisation.
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26 Induction before being logically characterised – as opposed to deduction or syllogism – is
the expression of a form of the “relation” of exchange which the ordinary man in the
common affairs of life – “reasoning on common life” – knits with his environment of action
and experience. It is the form of an attitude which permits practical inferences which,
like those of the craftsman, confront particular cases to render them operative in other
situations of action or of experience.
27 However, Reid says something else: that inference as a propensity is borne by the search
for effects,  for consequences (“to  show us how to produce them (effects)”).  To put it  in
another way, the demand for generalisation, here, is not given for itself, but is implied by
the sequence which aims at identification of certain effects, of their “production.” 
28 The consequence of this is clearly formulated: it is this attitude which must serve as the
departure point for the practice of all types of knowledge (“it is the only one by which any
real  discovery in philosophy can be  made”).  It  is  therefore the same attitude which must
prevail for the two types of knowledge, that which aims at the improvement of affairs in
life, and that which aims at the elaboration of a distinct knowledge, that which is called
“philosophy.”22 
The man who first discovered that cold freezes water, and that heat turns it into
vapour, proceeded on the same general principles, and in the same method, by which
Newton discovered the law of gravitation and the properties of light. His Regulæ
philosophandi are maxims of common sense, and are practised every day in common life;
and he who philosophizes by other rules, either concerning the material system, or
the mind, mistakes his aim.23
29 Thus,  continuity  between  the  two  attitudes  is  claimed  even  more  explicitly,  Reid
affirming that  the  method  which  allowed  Newton  to  discover  the  universal  laws  of
gravity is drawn from the “maxims of common sense,” those which are daily “practised.” 
30 The general form of inference is thus common and it is this that characterises all  the
attitudes  of  knowledge,  whether  they  bear  on  affairs  of  life  or  upon more  complex
questions  –  “the  material  system  or  the  mind.” It  is  indeed  the  identity  of  nature  of
complexities implied in the activity of knowledge which supports this commonality.
31 So there is no reason here to make a difference between “the craftsman in his shop” and
the “philosopher,” Hume restates.24 Both of them find in this that it is possible to improve
the precision of that  which is  known in ignorance of first  causes,  final  causes,  or “first
principles.” On that level, nothing distinguishes the two attitudes ontologically.
32 It is unfounded will to install a rupture which characterises sceptical philosophy. Common
sense and our education are there to resist this:
And if common sense or the principles of education happen not to be stubborn, it is
odds but we end in absolute scepticism.25 
33 “Our” common sense, the consolidation of which is permitted by education, gives the
means to avoid giving up to an “absolute scepticism.” Common sense is thus not just the
specific domain of practical life and of a type of knowledge – that of ordinary experiences
– it is equally acting under the form of an array of incorporated dispositions, which, by
their consolidation (“the results of our upbringing”), resist the corrosive power of this other
inclination “doubting.” This spontaneous, and then controlled resistance is therefore that
which allows rupture to be avoided with all of its vertiginous consequences. 
34 Common sense, as an “environment” and as an “array of propensities” is thus links in a
vital manner to human attitudes, since defective relationships with its domain condemns
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those concerned to  madness.  Once again,  here is  what  Reid says  with regard to  the
hyperbolic doubt of Descartes:
A man that disbelieves his own existence, is surely as unfit to be reasoned with, as a
man that believes he is made of glass. There may be disorders in the human frame
that may produce such extravagancies, but they will never be cured by reasoning.26
35 Two errors thus define the posture of cogito. On the one hand, it implies going against a
natural tendency which is precisely that of a “confidence” in, and a “conscience” of the
witness of  the senses.27 On the other hand,  and in supposing that  such principles of
“constitution of our nature” are lacking, it is certainly not reason that will be able to re-
establish  them.  There  is  in  this  defiance  of  doubt  something  vital  which  engages  –
through the consistent and stubborn character of common sense rendered active by the
bias of certain of our dispositions or propensities – all our constitution without which
self-preservation and the possibility of action find themselves in question.
36 In  what  manner  does  such  a  liaison  between  “confidence,”  “conscience”  and
“constitution of our nature” operate? Precisely through common and ordinary actions.
I’ll cite Reid: 
Descartes,  Malebranche  and  Locke,  have  all  employed  their  genius  and  skill  to
prove the existence of a material world; and with very bad success. Poor untaught
mortals believe undoubtedly, that there is a sun, moon and stars; an earth, which we
inhabit;  country,  friends,  and  relations,  which  we  enjoy;  land,  houses,  and
moveables, which we possess. But philosophers, pitying the credulity of the vulgar,
resolve to have no faith but what is founded upon reason.28
37 The sceptical attitude and the attitude guided by common sense separate from each other
here on the manner of consolidating, by experience, action and belief where, precisely,
the  sceptic  interrupts  this  sequence  to  limit  it  to  the  sole  moment  of  belief  which
corrosive reason questions and places in doubt:
It is a bold philosophy that rejects, without ceremony, principles which irresistibly
govern the belief and the conduct of all mankind in the common concerns of life;
and  to  which  the  philosopher  himself  must  yield,  after  he  imagines  he  hath
confuted them. Such principles are older, and of more authority, than Philosophy:
she rests upon them as her basis, not they upon her.29
38 The sceptical attitude disassociates knowledge from action; it separates the immediate
end and immediately practical, which makes the knowledge, or this type of knowledge, a
means of action, a means without which action is quite simply unrealisable. However, man
doted with common sense believes in the existence of the earth because he lives there; he
believes in his friends because they are a source of joys and pleasures; in the same manner,
he possesses the house and furniture in which he lives and for which there is no practical
reason to doubt in their existence, etc.
39 It is thus the ordinary relation – daily reiterated, confirmed and consolidated – of given
forms of action and experience which allow the indubitable character of the world to be
placed. The exteriority and reality of the world without which action is quite simply
impossible. From there, and from the point of view of common sense, experience and
action are conducts which support each other to accomplish their movements and arrive
at their ends, at a reality from which they proceed and of which there is no reason to
doubt. The age and authority of these principles – “the belief and the conduct of all mankind
in the common affairs of life” – are the foundation of all practical knowledge, and, as the last
citation suggests, should equally be so for philosophy.
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40 Thence, the sceptical attitude, embodied by Berkeley and radicalised by Hume, installs an
insuperable breach between the two domains – that of practical knowledge and that of
philosophy  understood  here  as  science  –; the  major  consequence  is  the  impossible
affirmation, from the point of view of reason, of the reality of the exterior world and the
human mind:
[…]  and  as  the  Bishop  (Berkeley)  undid  the  whole  material  world,  this  author
(Hume) upon the same grounds, undoes the world of spirits, and leaves nothing in
nature but ideas and impressions, without any subject on which they may be
impressed.30
41 The conclusion of this reasoning is this: if one adopts the attitude of sceptical philosophy,
of which Hume would be the most complete expression according to Reid, two worlds find
themselves resolutely separated, no longer allowing common sense to take hold. On one
side,  there  would  be  men acting,  motivated  and  directed  by  unfounded  beliefs  in  a
common and ordinary, but illusory, world. On the other side, there would be philosophers
who strive to found in reason what could be the reality of an exterior world and which is
forever out of their reach.
42 What Reid’s thesis shows, is that there really is, on one hand, a world of common sense
where  the  experiences  of  perception  and  human  actions  daily  come  to  confirm  its
external reality and consistence, and on the other hand, a world of sceptical philosophy,
of which the illegitimately extended usage of reason leads to making the external world
into something elusive and inaccessible,  and thus reducing common experiences and
beliefs into nothing but vain fancies.31 
43 In that, the sceptical attitude is really that which destroys the world, the mind, and the
identity  of  the  subject.  In  that,  equally,  to  return  to  common sense,  to  restore  the
legitimacy and the legality of its domain, is to prove the sophist character of an attitude
of  knowledge which,  in the name of excessive pretensions bearing on the powers of
reason,  separates  that  which  is  “irresistibly”  linked:  to  act  and to  believe  by  the
intermediary of the senses, in the reality of the exterior world.
44 In that, therefore, the philosophy of common sense such as it is here claimed by Reid, is
really the condition of the possible reconstruction of a certain realism: that of the world of
ordinary  life,  that  of  vital  relationships  between  knowledge  and  practices,  that  of
sequences that are reiterated between experiences of knowledge as resources “in view of”
human action and conservation. 
45 The rehabilitation of common sense appears in Reid as the occasion to reveal the idealist
character of the sceptical posture which renders the world unreal – by the criticism of
matter in Berkeley – and casts into doubt as far as the very existence of a subject of
perception – by the reduction of the real in the world of impressions and ideas in Hume.
46 Scepticism is thus to Reid an idealism, since it manages to destroy even the evidence of
the reality of the exterior world without which there is no conservation of a “self.” It
poses as  problematic the general  form of  a stable relationship between the world of
common sense and the world of critical or philosophical knowledge, which comes back to
saying  that  the  sceptical  attitude  renders  the  two  worlds  incommensurable,  that  of
practice and common sense, and that of academic knowledge and science.
47 If the question of the specific interpretation of the sceptical theses of Hume is put to one
side it will be accorded, therefore, that the problematic of common sense such as it is
formulated in Reid, at least in that which we have retained here, allows a triple result: (1)
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revealing the fallacious character of the question of realism where it raises a certain
philosophical attitude; (2) giving back a hold to practice and action for which a certain
type of knowledge is indispensable and legitimate; (3) restoring the unity, that is to say
the  effectiveness  of  the  relationship  between the  domain  of  common sense  and the
domain of science which the paradigmatic example remains, in the eyes of this Scot, that
of Newton.
48 I wish to show that some of the considerations of John Dewey on common sense can be
situated in a comparable manner.  Put another way,  taking account of  the fashion in
which the statement of this question finds part of its pertinence in the criticism of a
philosophical attitude which is that of “intellectualism,” and which is supported by the
reconsideration of the nature of experience and its relation to knowledge.
 
Common Sense Against Intellectualism
49 In the first chapter of Experience and Nature,32 Dewey attaches himself to the distinction of
what he terms “philosophical method” from “empirical method.” What is at stake in this
comparison is the aptitude of these methods to take account of experience, all experience
and all experiences. 
By “intellectualism” as an indictment is meant the theory that all experiencing is a
mode of  knowing,  and that  all  subject-matter,  all  nature,  is,  in  principle,  to  be
reduced and transformed till it is defined in terms identical with the characteristics
presented by refined objects of science as such. The assumption of “intellectualism”
goes contrary to the facts of  what is  primarily experienced.  For things are objects to be
treated,  used,  acted  upon and with,  enjoyed and endured,  even more  than things  to  be
known. They are things had before they are things cognized.33 
50 The accusation of intellectualism thus designates a precise theoretical gesture: the fact of
having an experience finds itself assigned to the exclusive function of knowledge and
“things,” which, in the ordinary course of experience, are also “means” or “instruments”
for action, implied in the sensations, affections and wishes, which find themselves, by an
effect  of  posture,  reduced to  the  status  of  an “object”  of  knowledge. This  reduction
operates on two levels: it transforms the “thing” into an object for knowledge; it brings
back the content of the experience to the status of an exclusive instrument of knowledge.
34 Which therefore implies that: 
When intellectual experience and its material are taken to be primary, the cord that
binds experience and nature is cut.35
51 Experience so understood thus introduces a breach with nature. It renders the activity of
knowledge foreign to nature and makes nature into an exteriority which always escapes
experience, with which it has no relations. The relation “act – be affected by,” which is
the first form of the relation of exchange between nature and an organism, certainly
contains a dimension which is originally cognitive, but this is not however always already
an  effective  knowledge.36 The  problem,  for  the  “empirical  philosopher”  will  be  to
understand how it can become one in the movement itself of experience. So as not to
break the continuum “nature/experience” and to avoid supernatural explanations, good
philosophical  method  must  therefore  admit  that  cognition  is  only  one  dimension
amongst others of the fact of experiencing.
52 However  the breach “nature”  –  “experience,”  which is  the  fact  of  the intellectualist
posture,  brings with it  other consequences which return to the question of  common
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sense.  We are thus exposed to disregarding other dimensions of  reality of  the world
which we experience:
When  real objects  are identified,  point  for  point,  with  knowledge-objects,  all
affectional and volitional objects are inevitably excluded from the “real” world,  and are
compelled to find refuge in the privacy of an experiencing subject or mind.37
53 In effect, the primacy accorded to reason leads to the ignorance of what the most ordinary
experiences do, within which are implied affectivity, will, etc.: 
But in ordinary matters and in scientific inquiries, we always retain the sense that
the material chosen is selected for a purpose; there is no idea of denying what is left
out,  for  what  is  omitted  is  merely  that  which  is  not  relevant  to  the  particular
problem and purpose in hand.38
54 The posture of the intellectualist philosopher is built upon the disqualification of a whole
world of experience which is also the world of common sense, at least, a world where the
question of knowledge is not posed as an end in itself.
55 Passing from the “philosophical method” to the “empirical method” in the sense already
given, is not to make a difference of nature between the posture of the “philosopher” that
John Dewey designates by the expression of “empirical philosophy,”39 that of the “scientist”
and that of the “ordinary man.” That community of nature engages in the same way, the
agent implied in a concrete or practical action, the scientist and/or technician leading an
enquiry to experiment certain types of consequence in a situation deliberately chosen
and constructed, and finally the philosopher, who pretends to identify the specificity of
knowledge for itself. 
56 In every case, the choices thus operated do not equivalate to the denial of that which is
put aside from reality. This is still partially determined, that is to say valorised, by a type
of sought outcome. From there, the constitution of an “empirical philosophy” cannot rest
upon the radicalisation of the breach between experience and nature because such a
breach envelopes, in the same gesture, all that which separates the domain of common
sense from that of science. 
57 If in Reid, the direct confrontation of the sceptical attitude with the conduct of common
sense  allows  the  display  of  the  manner  in  which  scepticism  leads  illegitimately  to
rendering  the  world  unreal,  the  world  of  things  and  matter  in  Berkeley,  that  of
conscience and identity in Hume, in Dewey the criticism of intellectualism allows the
display of the manner in which this attitude drives out a whole part of reality, notably by
the ontological disqualification of everything which ordinarily is made of experience, of
everything  that  commonly  supports  the  movement  of  our  actions.  To  encapsulate,
everything that bears upon “ordinary matters.”
58 Intellectualism is  therefore  an idealism that  subsumes  a  trait  or  a  character  of  real
experience to make of it the paradigm of all experience. And as an idealism, it disqualifies
the domain of common sense which, from that fact, remains bogged down in a world that
is ontologically incomplete, unfinished and devalued, since it does not conform to that
which is posed from the point of view of reason.
59 As James says in defining “rational fallacy”:
The rationalist’s  fallacy  here  is  exactly  like  the  sentimentalist’s.  Both  extract  a
quality  from  the  muddy  particulars  of  experience,  and  find  it  so  pure  when
extracted that they contrast it with each and all its muddy instances as an opposite
and higher nature. All the while it is their nature.40
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60 The critique of the intellectualist attitude allows the adoption of the “empirical method”
precisely because it starts from experience, all experience, and returns to experience. It is
the only method which permits the positive consideration of “common sense” as a domain
of reality which is experienced. But this rehabilitation does not aim at common sense such
as  it  is. Making it  the object  of  the empiric  method thus  supposes  that  it  be  put  in
relationship, related to, notably through analogies, with science. 
61 It is thus that it can be admitted that the scientist, to make his inquiry, makes deliberate
choices, which does not at all mean that he denies the reality of that which he puts to one
side. Just as the man of common sense accesses a type of practical knowledge linked to an
end, itself also practical, and of which the articulation means/end leads to other choices.
Is only the philosopher,  or at least one that adopts the intellectual attitude,  is  to be
dispensed from such conduct, instituting his choices in a “pure” and “absolute” reality?41
62 In the essay “Common Sense and Science: Their Respective Frames of References,” Dewey
takes the example of water to show all the multiplicity of “references” engaged in the
multiplicity of experiences bearing on these “ordinary matters”: 
How, for example, should the water of direct and familiar acquaintance (as distinct
from H2O of the scientific frame) be described save as that which quenches thirst,
cleanses the body and soiled articles, in which one swims, which may drown us,
which  supports  boats,  which  as  rain  furthers  growth  of  crops,  which  in
contemporary community life runs machinery, including locomotives, etc.?42
63 To experience, to act, supposes therefore really choices through the bias of a “selective
emphasis.”43 That which is retained or put to the side is different because it is always
directed by different interests to reply to different goals.  It  is  in that that the three
attitudes, of the ordinary man, the scientist, and the philosopher, should be compared.
They are part of a common “ethology.”44 
64 The  reduction  of  the  thing  to  an  object  of  knowledge  is  thus  acceptable,  for  the
philosopher, as for the scientist, on the double condition of not forgetting that it is a case
here of a valorisation which answers to a choice and that that choice always implies the
exclusion of  other “characteristics,”45 other determinations of  the thing and therefore
other elements of the real which can be experienced. In the frame of another type of
experience,  and of another attitude,  that which has previously been removed will  be
retained as “indispensable” and as equally “real,” (LW 1: 31).
65 If it is to be found that in the course of ordinary experiences, this principle of selection,
often ignored, does not lend itself to consequence because of the diversity of interests
which are given to things, it is not the same for philosophy which, again emphasises
Dewey,  proves  itself  to  have  a  regressive  attachment  to  that  particular  moment  of
experience which is that of its dimension of knowledge, (LW 1: 31). 
66 The “empirical method” (LW 1: 34), analogically constituted on the model of experimental
empiricism, thus renders explicit the consequences which result from a “choice,” will
reconstruct the singularity of the path which goes from this choice until the obtained
result, and will test the relative value of it.46 
67 Critical demands belonging to the empirical method which permit the validation of its
exactitude, therefore redirect the movement of knowledge towards the elucidation of the
course of ordinary experience:
What  empirical  method  exacts  of  philosophy  is  two  things: 
First, that refined methods and products be traced back to their origin in primary
experience, in all its heterogeneity and fullness; so that the needs and problems out
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of which they arise and which they have to satisfy be acknowledged. Secondly, that
the secondary methods and conclusions be brought back to the things of ordinary
experience, in all their coarseness and crudity, for verification.47 
68 The  empirical  method,  in  philosophy,  should  permit  the  reestablishment  of  the
continuity between knowledge and the ordinary course of  experience,  or,  as  he says
several pages late:
There is a special service which the study of philosophy may render. Empirically
pursued it will not be a study of philosophy but a study, by means of philosophy, of
life-experience.48 
69 The “empirical method,” in its experimentalist dimension, thus becomes again a means,
an instrument, and not, as in the intellectualist attitude, a finality which expects to relive
philosophically problems which are philosophical or for philosophers. It is indeed in this
reversal  that  the passage from one to the other of  philosophical  attitudes resides,  a
passage which thus permits making of “ordinary matters” and the domain of common
sense a privileged object of all philosophy.
 
Between Common Sense and Science: The Demand
for an Attitude of Control 
Science is not Independent of Common Sense in Reid
70 Analysis of the relationships and implications between science and common sense is not a
specific object of Reid’s critical approach; however, scattered considerations can be found
there which permit the defining, by omission, of certain principles of that analysis. 
71 If common sense could act as a critical proof with regard to the sceptical attitude,49 if the
man of common sense is gifted with dispositions which permit him, spontaneously or
through education, to resist doubt when he is engaged in the affairs of ordinary life – and
he is permanently – disqualification of scepticism does not ipso facto bring with it the
disqualification of science. Between the two domains, there exist more than one possible
continuity.
In the introductory chapter to his Inquiry, Reid recalls that the inferential and inductive
procedure which allowed Newton to establish the laws of gravitation is analogous to that
which is employed in the reasoning of common sense.50 Without doubt it must be added,
in a formulation which this time I borrow from Dewey, that:
in fact science practiced today began only when the work was refined and extended
by adoption of material devices and technological operations.51
72 Sciences intervenes as an instrumental mediation which has as a possible consequence
the invention and the construction of new systems of observation, which come to modify,
enlarge,  and extend the  capacities  of  experimentation of  that  which is  given in  the
universe of common sense, at least at first.
73 This modified continuity of the relationship between common sense and philosophy52 is
emphasised. It is implied in a recurrent fashion in Inquiry, where notably the faculties of
perception  are  analysed  and  the  distinction  of  principle  between  “sensation”  and
“quality” is posed. An example amongst others:
It  is  the  business  of  philosophers  to  investigate,  by  proper  experiments  and
induction,  what heat and cold are in bodies;  […] these questions are within the
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province of  philosophy;  for  common sense says nothing on the one side or  the
other.53
74 So philosophy intervenes as a prolongation of certain experiences of common sense, even
if the questions that they pose are not its own. This disjuncture between the two types of
questioning is not however a breach. To say nothing about the “qualities” of hot and cold
in the body does not forbid a practical and reasoned usage of our perceptions of hot and
cold and, therefore, guidance of a number of actions and experiences partly determined
by such “qualities.”
75 Even if the question is not drawn immediately from what common sense could have to
say, it can be estimated however that for the actions and experiences that operate in the
world of common sense, there is indeed something to do with the answer given to this
question.
76 Forcing himself to identify what these qualities consist of, from the point of view of the
natural philosopher, indeed remains for Reid a specific and distinct preoccupation, but
the practical implications – that is to say the consequences – linked with the responses
brought by science to these questions, have something to do with the domain of common
sense and can modify it.
77 This point is explicitly affirmed by Reid who, with regard to sight and perception in
general,  reminds  us  in  these  terms  of  the  relationships  between  “common
understanding” and “science”: 
The more obvious conclusions drawn from our perceptions, by reason, make what
we call common understanding;  by which men conduct themselves in the common
affairs of life, and by which they are distinguished from idiots. The more remote
conclusions  which  are  drawn  from  our  perceptions,  by  reason,  make  what  we
commonly  call  science in  the  various  parts  of  nature,  whether  in  agriculture,
medicine, mechanics, or any part of natural philosophy.54
78 The distinction between the two understandings permits the identification of two types
of complementary reasoning. On one hand, that of the man of the common sense which is
borne by the epistemology of practical evidence: the inference there is brief,  directly
articulated to the realisation of a practical end, to the way in which the artisan seeks to
modify his practice in view of obtaining a subsequent result which has to be improved.
The evidence is thereby borne by the fact of a perception and a realisation conferred by
practice which is easily verifiable and adjustable. 
79 On this level, the limit is not between illusion or the falsehood of a belief and the truth of
the point of view of philosophy, it is between the possibility of sane judgement and faulty
judgement or idiocy (Inquiry, VI, 20, ibid.). Reid recalls this once more when he evokes the
belief accorded to the information given us by nature:
And now when I reflect upon what is past, I do not find that I have been imposed
upon by this  belief.  I  find,  that  without  it  I  must  have perished by a  thousand
accidents. I find, that without it I should have been no wiser now than when I was
born.55 
80 The frontier which permits to thus mark out this epistemology of the evidence is brought
by the taking into consideration of the consequences that the beliefs which support it
permit to produce or to avoid. The evidence is only the statement on an epistemological
level  of  the  operative  and  primary  character  of  the  anthropological  principal  of
conservation.
Attitudes of Knowledge and Common Sense
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
12
81 On the other hand, the growth of the distances covered by inductive inference and the
indirect character of the results associated with it allow the domain of understanding of
science to be defined. It distinguishes itself from common understanding as does close
from far, as does the immediate from the mediate.
82 These distinctions underline the complementarity that is found in the listing of diverse
sciences coming from the domain of science: agriculture, medicine, etc. The growth of
knowledge is thus not without effect upon the common world of experience and human
conducts.
83 While Reid does not say so explicitly, it can nonetheless be understood, here, that the
development of the arts and sciences is indeed a general factor in the improvement of the
conditions of life in society. The two understandings, being distinct, are therefore no less
linked  together:  the  forms  of  the  ordinary  practice  of  men  of  common  sense  are
influenced and modified by the enlargement of knowledge produced by the sciences.
84 The question thus bounded by the means of the distinction of understandings allows the
recognition of all the positive side of a knowledge borne by observation and experience.56
A knowledge which, in its turn, produces fortunate effects – civilisation, notably – upon
the ordinary conduct of life.
85 So there is no reason to think that, in Reid, the practical and continuous reference to
common sense in the ordinary course of human actions and experiences as a practical
mode of verification of the value of beliefs to consequences produced by the spontaneous
character of the “attitude” of resistance to doubt leads towards a substantial conception
of common sense and its domain. 
86 The evocation of the relationships between common sense and science, the recognition of
the progress  of  knowledge,  largely  display the dynamic  character  of  the domains  of
common sense and of science. The naturalist argument that here supports a part of the
Reidian epistemology of the evidence is thus not in contradiction with a certain historical
reading of the contents and the limits of the world of common sense. 
 
The Necessary Control of Interactions Between Science and
Common Sense in Dewey
87 As I have since the start of this study, I will limit my subject to the question of attitudes of
knowledge. It has been shown that it is not on the level of “logic”57 that the methods of
knowledge coming from common sense and science can be distinguished. From this point
of view, it suffices to “unify” them once more (LW 12: 84) for this is the paradigm of the
inquiry which prevails both here and there. 
88 This  continuity,  thus underlined by the logical  unity of  the investigatory method,  is
equally supported by another common property: in the domains of common sense and
science, it is “human affairs.”
I begin by saying that however the case stands, they are not to be distinguished
from  one  another  on  the  ground  that  science  is  not a  human  concern,  affair,
occupation.58
89 This community of nature should be enough to make it understood that in reality common
sense and science are always effectively linked together. To talk of the autonomisation of
the sciences is therefore an error:
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A part of the problem involved (an important part) being how it happened that the
scientific revolution which began a few short centuries ago has had as one outcome
a general failure to recognize science as itself an important human concern, so that,
as  already remarked,  it  is  often treated  as  a  peculiar  sort  of  entity  on its  own
account.59
90 So the question is  not  so much of  independence than of  the explanation of  the real 
dependence which exists  between the two domains and,  by way of  consequence,  the
reasons for which such a dependence, whilst being acknowledged, is not truly perceived.
91 To reply to these questions is to understand that it is important to be conscious of the
necessary character of this dependence on one hand, and on the other, to make of this
necessity, not something which imposes itself as a fatum but something upon which one
should be able to act, something which can be oriented more deliberately, that is say
consciously or knowingly.
92 To render explicit the relationship of dependence that is necessary between the dynamic
of science and the development of consequences upon and in the domain of common
sense is thus to adopt a point of view which is not longer only that of epistemology; it is
also to recognise that the question is equally moral and political.
93 In this sense, the attitudes of knowledge which determine these different domains are
attitudes which must be oriented by values.60 The ethology of conducts of knowledge
envelope  in  one  same  and  sole  orientation  the  whole  of  these  epistemological,
methodological, ethical and political demands.
94 The  apparent  autonomisation  of  dynamics,  which  rests  upon  the  separation  of  the
domains of common sense and science, should therefore be historically justified to be
able to envisage the practical and political means for a reunification. This is the sense
that it is possible to give to this practical demand for control: to link together the domains
and reunify the dynamics or act upon the manner in which relationships are formed
between science and common sense.
95 But  to  speak  here  of  apparent  autonomisation  does  not  signify  that  there  is  not,
historically factors  which  have  permitted,  beyond  all  functional  distinction,  the
detachment of the two domains. As he often does, Dewey returns to what has marked,
from the start,  the manner in which the separation operated between an activity of
knowledge posed as  pure and detached from all  implication in ordinary life,  and an
ensemble of practical activities, riveted to the demands of life, to the demands of change;
61 and  how  that  distinction  has  progressively  corresponded  to  the  ontological
disqualification of practical knowledge vis-a-vis theoretical knowledge. 
96 Notably, Dewey comes back to the emergence and consolidation of specialised groups
having a special vocation in the domains of knowledge for its own sake.62 The distinction
of a necessary social division of labour emerges:
Scientific inquiry as a particular kind of work is engaged in by a group of persons
who  have  undergone  a  highly  specialized  training  to  fit  them  for  doing  that
particular kind of work.63
97 The division widens until it poses the activity of knowledge as a distinctive mark, “a self-
enclosed entity.”64 From there, it can find in itself the mainspring of its own development
and, thus, give the appearance of complete autonomy. 
98 All  which  precedes  does  not  however  come  back  to  affirming  that  the  dynamics  of
common sense and science must cover each other. It is not at all a case of defending an
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idealistic position which would have as its counterpart the disqualification of science as
such.65 It is a case of understanding that the demand for control rests principally upon
just appreciation and valorisation of their distinction:
(T)hey are not to be distinguished from one another on the ground that science is
not a human concern, affair, occupation. For that is what it decidedly is. The issue
to be discussed is that of the kind of concern or care which marks off scientific activity
from those forms of human behaviour that fall within the scope of common sense.66
99 If, in both cases the attitudes of “doing” and “knowing” prevail as much as each other, it
remains that their articulation differs and that for science, the attitudes are deployed
with the motive of advancing the “system of knowings” and the “system of knowns.”67 Which
should not lead us to forget that: 
(W)hat science is of is about what common sense subject-matter is of, (and that this
fact) is disguised from ready recognition when science becomes so highly developed
that the immediate subject of inquiry consists of what has previously been found out.
68
100 Several factors lead thence to see as radically autonomous and separate that which stems
from the dynamic of the sciences.  There is the fact that the growth of specialisation
nourishes by itself the demand for knowledge: it is a case of replying to the demands
belonging to the results, which are always provisional, of the inquiry that is in course. If
the movement is envisaged in its temporal continuity, then that which precedes implies a
part of that which will succeed it.
101 The articulation of the present and the future is, at least in part, borne by the fact that
the given and actual state of a type of knowledge conditions the future and potential
development  of  the  knowledge.  This  is  what  the  use  emphasised  by  Dewey  here  of
adverbs  of  time  such  as  “immediately” and “previously” suggests.  This  internal  and
external dimension of the progress of knowledge, for science, should not mask the fact
that the point of departure remains that of “common sense subject-matter(s).” 
102 To  this  first  fact  is  added  another  which  is  determinant.  There  are  always  specific
interests of knowledge, and these interests are neither general nor universal. Because
knowing scientifically is a fundamentally human affair, it is erroneous and dangerous to
believe that scientific growth did not develop in the perspective of primordially human
affairs.
103 The problems that are chosen to be resolved, in a word, the interests of knowledge, do not
emerge in a contingent manner; they are tributary to circumstances and relationships of
strength. Because the problems to be resolved do not select themselves, there is really a
specific direction given to the development of knowledge and the organisation of the
inquiries which are linked to it. Inquiries are thus influenced in their orientation and
their achievement by human factors and dominant interests.69 
104 There are thus indeed relationships between science and  human affairs,  between the
interests of science and the interests of the group. These are precisely the relations which
are  masked  and  it  is  there  that  resides,  for  Dewey,  the  philosophical  nature  of  the
problem of relationships between common sense and sciences:
In any case, it is harmful as well as stupid to refuse to note that scientific knowing
is  one  human  concern  growing  out  of  and  returning  into  other  more  primary
human concerns. […] There is, then, a problem that is of philosophical concern in
this matter of the relation of the concerns of common sense and of science with
each other.70
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105 From there, the difficulty is really that which consists of admitting that although science
finds its origin in the matrix of activities of common sense, its return is not evident. As
Kennedy reminds us in his gloss,  “Science takes its  departure from common sense but the
return road has been blocked.”71
106 The autonomisation of dynamics is therefore not real, that of science is really determined
by private interests and the whole philosophical and political question is to socialise the
interests in the name of which such a dynamic of development of scientific knowledge
can be reorientated. Here is the perfectly explicit statement of the moral and political
problem which is raised by the articulation between common sense and science from the
point of view of attitudes of knowledge:
The problem, then, concerns the possibility of giving direction to this return-wave
so  as  to  minimize  evil  consequences  and  to  intensify  and  extend  good
consequences,  and,  if  it  is  possible,  to  find  out  how  such  return  is  to  be
accomplished.72
107 The political question is thus double: firstly, it supposes the explicitness, historically and
empirically,  of  the  particular  interests  which  direct  the  problems  treated  and  the
inquiries put in place. It means avowing the always-dependent character of the progress
of that knowledge, and making appear the relationship between attitudes of knowledge
and the accomplishment of situated and private particular interests. Even knowledge for
its  own  sake  is  a  situated  knowledge  which  envelopes  the  taking  into  account  of
conditions of space and time which make of its progress a specifically oriented progress.
108 It  is  a  case,  next,  starting  from  a  non-idealistic  and  non-moralising  concept  of  the
development of science, of showing that it is not the principle itself of the relationship of
all knowledge with specific interests that must be condemned or brought into question. It
is an enlargement or socialisation of interests that must be achieved so as to not block the
“return-wave” in the direction of common sense.
109 Such a socialisation being finally one of the essential conditions to rediscover that which
equally defines the attitude of scientific knowledge, its liberative power:
The liberative outcome of the abstraction that is supremely manifested in scientific
activity is the transformation of the affairs of common sense concern which has
come  about  through  the  vast  return  wave  of  the  methods  and  conclusions  of
scientific concern into the uses and enjoyments (and sufferings) of everyday affairs;
together with an accompanying transformation of judgment and of the emotional
affections, preferences, and aversions of everyday human beings.73
110 The problem of common sense and the paths of its controlled transformation thus reside
in the extension of the interests which support the development of knowledge in the
domain of the sciences, and in the manner of generalising the interests in the name of
which such a domain develops. It is only in this context that the knowledge allows its
liberative power to be shared.
111 The problem is thus not only philosophical,  it is political and practical.  It supposes a
transformation in the organisation of society which brings back into cause the private
character of the interests which support the development of science.
112 Because the affairs of science are human affairs, because the control of the conditions in
which men act and make experiments is  the only path to take with the direction of
improvement of the conditions of life, the completely academic question of interactions
between  “common  sense”  and  “science”  should  be  reformulated  in  the  terms  of  a
practical question.
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113 This  question  engages,  on  one  hand,  the  elucidation  of  the  respective  attitudes  of
knowledge in terms of what they have in common and in how they are distinct, and on the
other hand, reaffirms the political necessity to orientate the flux of the “return-wave”




114 The pragmatist  analysis  of  common sense in Dewey that we have proposed does not
pretend to synthesise all the problems that it raises. It seems to us enlightening, on one
hand, to show that a certain number of the preoccupations that define the approach of
Dewey, are echoed in the tradition of Anglo-Scottish modern empiricism.
115 In this sense the comparison with Reid should not be understood as a historiographical
effort  to  reconstruct  a  lineage  –  the  criticisms  levelled  by  Dewey  towards  modern
empiricism are sufficiently recurrent to avoid this error. 
116 It  aims  rather,  by  a  methodological  alignment,  to  indicate  a  certain  convergence  of
preoccupations.  It  is  starting  from the  ethos  of  knowledge  that  it  seems  possible  to
understand  how the  test  of  common  sense  permits  the  relativisation  of  the  critical
pretensions  of  the  sceptical  attitude,  and to  avow the  illegitimate  pretension of  the
intellectualist attitude.
117 In both cases, this test was also the occasion for a requalification of reason which must be
admitted to support all experiment, whether it be implicated in the practical movement
of actions “in view of” or in the specific form of an activity of  knowledge for itself.
Common sense, realism, and attitudes of knowledge thus support an approach in terms of
relationships which I think I have shown it is possible to find traces of in Reid.
118 It is thus possible to understand, starting from this, that the problem of common sense
cannot be separated from that of the qualification of the relationships that it holds with
science and its development. From there, the question of the attitude of knowledge must
be linked together with that of the interests of knowledge. The question is not only raised
from epistemology, it implies a moral and political range and makes, now, of the world of
common  sense,  that  which  should  be  reconstructed  as  the  complete  and  integral
destination of the “return-wave.”
119 It is just because the environment of common sense is not the destination of progress in
the sciences that it finds itself transformed without the flux which transforms it being
truly controlled so as to make it the occasion for a larger and shared improvement of the
ordinary conditions of life and experience.
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Supremacy of Method,” 178-s. 
3. Dewey (LW 13, IV). “Propositions of Appraisal,” 208-s. 
4. See Segrest 2009. 
5. Dewey (LW 12: 66-85). 
6. Dewey, (1948a: 197-208). 
7. Bentley & Dewey 1949, in Dewey (1991: chapter 10, LW 16: 242-s.). 
8. Dewey (MW 6, “Preface”: ix-xii); Essay “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy”: 17-8. 
9. Dewey (MW 1: 122). 
10. “In the concerns of common sense knowing is  as necessary,  as important,  as in those of
science. But knowing is there, for the sake of agenda the what and the how of which have to be
studied and to be learned – in short, known in order that the necessary affairs of every day life be
carried on.” (LW 16, my emphasizes).
11. Scot Ph. Segrest 2009, already cited, thus shows the important role which figures such as John
Witherspoon (1723-94) and James McCosh (1811-94) played in the importation and appropriation
of Scottish Common Sense in America. (Segrest 2009: 3. “Witherspoon’s ‘Plain Common Sense’,” 64-
s.; 4. “McCosh’s Scientific Intuitionism,” 101-s.) Starting from an analysis of the corpus of William
James, he gives an account of the connection between this tradition of common sense and the
first  pragmatism  (Segrest  2009:  3-s.  and  5.  “The  Common  Sense  Basis  of  James’s  Pragmatic
Radical Empiricism,” 133-s.).
12. See, for example, James 1907: “Pragmatism and Common Sense” in Pragmatism: A New Name
for Some Old Ways of Thinking, in 1975: Pragmatism, The Works of William James.
13. For a first approach to the different significances of the occurrences of “common sense” in
Thomas Reid, see Somerville (1987: 418-29).
14. So as to take up the typology proposed by James (1907), Pragmatism, Lecture VI “Pragmatism’s
Conception of Truth,” in The Works of William James, 1: 109-s. 
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15. The expression employed by Dewey, notably in (1948: 207-s.; LW 16: 255), with regard to this
“return” of consequence – from the domain of science towards that of common sense – is that of
the “return-wave.” 
16. The designation of this “domain” leads to real terminological proliferation in the articles of
Dewey. So, just to take the example of “Common Sense and Science: Their Respective Frames of
References”  (LW 16:  242-57),  Dewey  talks  of  “traits  of  Common  Sense,”  of  “subjects-matters  of
Common Sense,” but also of “Common Sense frame,” of “framework of Common Sense,” etc. He also
talks of “domain.” It is this last term that I retain here. 
17. “Such (common sense) inquiries are, accordingly, different from those which have knowledge as their
goal. The attainment of knowledge of some things is necessarily involved in common sense inquiries, but it
occurs for the sake of settlement of some issue of use and enjoyment, and not, as in scientific inquiry, for its
own sake,” LW 12: 66-7. 
18. In the same way, I won’t enter here the discussion of knowing if the Reidian reading of Hume
is exact. It would be possible to show, that from many angles, the objections made to Hume’s
scepticism can be nuanced, and that Hume is not that far from the demands of a methodological 
scepticism founded upon a reading that insists as much on the articulation necessary between
the  principles  of  practical  life  and philosophical  knowledge.  I’d  use  as  a  proof  this  citation,
amongst others, that is found in the First Part of Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: “That the
larger  experience  we acquire,  and the  stronger  reason we are  endowed with,  we always render our
principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call philosophy is nothing but
a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind.  To philosophize on such subjects is
nothing essentially different from reasoning on common life.” Hume (2007 [1779], Part I: 10; my
emphasis). 
19. “The true line of philosophic progress lies, in short, it seems to me, not so much through Kant
as round him to the point where now we stand. Philosophy can perfectly well outflank him, and
build herself up into adequate fullness by prolonging more directly the older English lines.” (James
1975 [1907], Vol. 1, Pragmatism, Appendixes, I “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,”
269; my emphasis). 
20. Reid (1995; 2015). From now: Inquiry. 
21. Inquiry, Introduction: 1. “The Importance of the Subject, and the Means of Prosecuting It,”
11-2. My emphasis. 
22. “Philosophy” in this text is used in a broad sense in which it also covers science. 
23. Inquiry: Ibid.: 12. My emphasis. 
24. “But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles shou’d be esteem’d a defect in the science of
man, I will venture to affirm, tha ‘tis a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which
we can employ ourselves, whether they be shops of the meanest artizans. None of them can go beyond
experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority.” Hume, (2007 [1739-40],
Vol. 1, § 10: 5-6). 
25. Inquiry:  Introduction,  3.  “The  Present  State  of  this  Part  of  Philosophy.  Of  Des  Cartes,
Malebranche, and Locke,” 16; my emphasis. 
26. Inquiry: Ibid.: 16; my emphasis.
27. Still  with regard to Descartes, “But why didn’t he prove the existence of his thought (‘I  think,
therefore  I  exist’)?  You  may  say  ‘Consciousness  assures  him  of  that.’  But  who  assures  him  that
consciousness is truthful? Can any man prove that his consciousness can’t deceive him? No man can; and
we can’t give a better reason for trusting consciousness than that every man, while his mind is
sound, is caused by the constitution of his nature to believe it unquestioningly, and to laugh at or
pity anyone who doubts its testimony,” Ibid.
28. Inquiry: 17-8; my emphasis. 
29. Inquiry: Introduction, V. “Of Bishop Berkeley; the Treatise of Human Nature; and of Scepticism,” 21. 
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30. Inquiry: 20. Here again, it is not a question of discussing Reid’s reading of Hume. A number of
considerations close to this can be found. Quite simply because Reid refuses to make a distinction
between a excessive scepticism – that which he talks of – and a mitigated scepticism, at least,
methodologically  contained  which  can  also  be  understood  as  a  principle  of  epistemological
vigilance.  See,  on  this  point,  the  distinction  proposed  by  Hume  (1999  [1748],  12).  “Of  the
Academical or Sceptical Philosophy,” 200-2. 
31. “That the votaries of this Philosophy, from a natural prejudice in her favour, have endeavoured
to extend her jurisdiction beyond its just limits, and to call to her bar the dictates of Common Sense,”
Inquiry, I. Introduction, 4. “Apology for Those Philosophers,” 19; my emphasis. 
32. Dewey LW 1, I. “Experience and Philosophic Method,” 10-s. 
33. LW 1: 28; my emphasis. 
34. See Dewey (1905), “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” in MW 3: 158-67. 
35. LW 1: 29; my emphasis. 
36. See Renault (2015: 19-44). 
37. LW 1: 30. My emphasis.
38. LW 1: 31. My emphasis. 
39. See LW 1: 40; 61; etc. 
40. James ([1907] 1975, Lecture VI: 110; my emphasis). De facto, he poses the same question on the
distinction between “pragmatism” and “intellectualism.” 
41. Unity of attitude thus sustained by the exigency of a common method in the three domains,
which is of the enquiry: “The attainment of unified method means that the fundamental unity of
the structure of inquiry in common sense and science be recognized, their difference being one in the
problems with which they are directly concerned, not to their respective logics.”(LW 12: 84; my
emphasis). 
42. LW 16: 245. 
43. LW 1: 34. 
44. I’m speaking here of “ethology” in the sense where John Stuart Mill in his System of Logic
(1843), more precisely in Book IV “The Logic of the Moral Sciences,” poses the principle of an
ethological science which, as it articulates between the general psychological laws of the human
mind on one hand, and on the other historical and empirical regularities, confers to the study of
characters the function of linking the psychological level and the empirical level. (See Mill, 1994;
see 5. “Of Ethology, or the Science of the Formation of Character,” 61-s.) As such it is an analysis
of “dispositions.” By analogy, I am speaking here of an ethology to designate the common ethos
which must link together the attitudes of the scientist, the ordinary man, and the philosopher.
Here again the emphasis is placed on the aspects of a certain ethos.
45. LW 1: 30. 
46. Emphasised here  –  without  going any further  –  is  the  community  of  preoccupation:  the
demand for the reconstruction of philosophy in Dewey implied the methodological transposition
of the model of the inquiry such as it operated in the universe of the experimental sciences of his
time. Just as the search for greater scientific rigour, in Bourdieu, supposed leaving behind the
generalist and complacent gestures of a certain fashionable philosophy, and implied, in his eyes,
turning towards positive science which could be sociology and/or anthropology. 
47. LW 1: 39. 
48. LW 1: 41. 
49. On philosophy: “Thus, the wisdom of philosophy is set in opposition to the common sense of
mankind. The first pretends to demonstrate a priori, that there can be no such thing as a material
world; that sun, moon, stars, and earth, vegetable and animal bodies, are, and can be nothing
else, but sensations in the mind, or images of those sensations in the memory and imagination;
[…]  This  opposition  betwist  philosophy  and  common  sense,  is  apt  to  have  a  very  unhappy
influence upon the philosopher himself. […] He considers himself, and the rest of his species, as
Attitudes of Knowledge and Common Sense
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
21
born under a necessity of believing ten thousand absurdities and contradictions, and endowed
with a pittance of reason, as is just sufficient to make this unhappy discovery […].” Inquiry, V, 7.
“Of the Existence of a Material World,” 67-8; original emphasis.
50. Inquiry, I. Introduction, 1 “The Importance of the Subject, and the Means of Prosecuting it,” 12-3. 
51. LW 16. 
52. Which in Reid includes natural philosophy, thus science. 
53. Inquiry, V “Touch,” 1. “Of Heat and Cold,” 55. 
54. Inquiry, Chap. VI “Of Seeing,” 20. “Of Perception in General,” 172.
55. Inquiry, VI, 20: 170. 
56. As Hume states in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) when he claims, in the “Introduction”:
“And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation.” Hume
(2007: 4; my emphasis). 
57. As Dewey defines it, specially in his Logic. Theory of Enquiry, LW 12: I-5 “The Needed Reform of
Logic,” 86-s. 
58. LW 16: 250. 
59. LW 16: 250-1. 
60. I will leave this point partly to one side for reasons of coherence. Reference can be made for
an example of presentation to Gail Kennedy (1954: 313-5). 
61. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, LW 4, 1. “Escape from Peril,” 20-1. 
62. “In the first place, it is a work and a work carried on by a distinct group or set of human
beings  constituting  a  profession having a  special  vocation,  exactly  as  is  the  case  with  those
engaged in law or medicine,” LW 16: 250. 
63. LW 16: 250. 
64. LW 16: 251. 
65. See  Dewey  (1948b):  “Upon  the  side  of  theory,  of  pseudo-philosophy,  the  attack  (against
science) rests upon calling the sciences ‘materialistic’ while literary subjects are identified with
whatever is idealistic and ‘spiritual’ in our traditions and institutions. This position rests back
upon belief in the separation of man from nature,” in LW 15: 188. 
66. LW 16: 250; my emphasis. 
67. LW 16: 251. 
68. LW 16: 252; original emphasis. 
69. This question of the privatisation of the interests of knowledge is a recurrent theme that is
found in many texts in Dewey. Its importance can be shown, for example in Dewey (1927-46), The
Public and its Problems. See, for example, the developments of chapter IV “Eclipse of the Public,”
LW 2: 304-s. 
70. LW, 16: 255. 
71. Kennedy (1954: 314). 
72. LW 16: 255-6; original emphasis. 
73. LW 16: 253. 
74. LW 12: 66. 
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ABSTRACTS
Throughout his intellectual career, John Dewey was asking the question of relationships between
knowledge of common sense and scientific knowledge. We propose to examine these relations in
the  light  of  a  comparison  with  Thomas  Reid,  one  of  the  founding  authors  of  the  modern
philosophy of common sense. This comparison tries to set up what should be considered as a
closer formulation of what knowledge consists in: a matter of attitudes, a set of dispositions. Such
a convergent formulation equally means not to bring into conflict or contradiction – in the style
of  a  “dualism”  –  what  are  common  sense  and  scientific  knowledge.  In  so  doing,  it  is  thus
necessary to reshape an operative distinction between those two kinds of “attitudes”; and this
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